Attachment FF - Jeffrey Thomas Maehr

The income tax law does not "plainly and clearly lay" any tax upon most citizens, or their income!

The Income Tax Law, Subtitle A of Title 26, United States Code, imposes a tax on the taxable income of certain individuals in 1:

"26 U.S.C. 1. Tax Imposed.

"(a) Married individuals filing joint returns and surviving spouses

"There is hereby imposed on the taxable income of

"(1) every married individual (as defined in section 7703) who makes a single return jointly with his spouse under section 6013, and

"(2) every surviving spouse (as defined in section 2(a)), a tax determined in accordance with the following table:

"(b) Heads of households

"There is hereby imposed on the taxable income of every head of a household (as defined in section 2(b)) a tax determined in accordance with the following table:

"(c) Unmarried individuals (other than surviving spouses and heads of households)

"There is hereby imposed on the taxable income of every individual (other than a surviving spouse as defined in section 2(a) or the head of a household as defined in section 2(b)) who is not a married individual (as defined in section 7703) a tax determined in accordance with the following table:

"(d) Married individuals filing separate returns

"There is hereby imposed on the taxable income of every married individual (as defined in section 7703) who does not make a single return jointly with his spouse under section 6013, a tax determined in accordance with the following table: . . ." (emphasis added) but this section does not designate anyone as liable for the payment of the tax.

It should be noted at this point that titles and headings, such as "Married individuals and surviving spouses filing joint returns" and "Heads of households" are not part of the law and have absolutely no legal effect. 26 U.S.C. 7806. Therefore, the actual statute commences with "There is hereby imposed . . ." The imposition of the tax is on taxable income, only, not on any person or entity. In contrast, see 26 U.S.C. 884, discussed more fully infra, which does impose a tax on an entity.

Subtitle A does, however, designate partners as liable for the taxes on income of a partnership, but only in their "individual" capacities (26 U.S.C. 701) while certain partnerships are declared liable for excess recapture of credits (26 U.S.C. 704).

Foreign corporations are specifically designated as the party liable for payment of the "Branch profits tax" imposed by 26 U.S.C. 884 (which, incidentally, does impose the tax on "any foreign corporation").

The only other party that is identified in the income tax law as liable for the payment of any income tax is revealed in 26 U.S.C. 1461:

Sec. 1461. Liability for withheld tax

"Every person required to deduct and withhold any tax under this chapter is hereby made liable for such tax and is hereby indemnified against the claims and demands of any person for the amount of any payments made in accordance with the provisions of this chapter."

"This chapter" is "Chapter 3 - Withholding Tax on Nonresident Aliens and Foreign Corporations."Thus the liable party in this instance is anyone withholding tax on nonresident aliens and foreign corporations.

There are no other references in Subtitle A (the income tax law) to anyone being liable for the tax imposed by 1 other than those: partners (but only in their "individual" capacity); certain large partnerships in certain excess credit situations; foreign corporations; and those withholding taxes on nonresident aliens and foreign corporations.

There is only one other party that is identified as being liable for the income tax, but to find that party we have to journey outside the realm of the income tax law to "Subtitle C

- Employment Taxes,"where we find:

Sec. 3403. Liability for tax

"The employer shall be liable for the payment of the tax required to be deducted and withheld under this chapter ["Subtitle C - Employment Taxes;

Chapter 24 - Collection of Income Tax at Source on Wages"], and shall not be liable to any person for the amount of any such payment."

Thus, the only persons being assigned any liability for the income tax imposed by 1 are those five instances partners, certain large partnerships, foreign corporations, withholders of taxes on nonresident aliens and foreign corporations and those employers required by Chapter 24 of Subtitle C to withhold taxes on employees.

The absence, or near absence, of a statutory provision specifying exactly who is liable for a tax imposed is not customary. 26 U.S.C. 2032A and 2056A specifically state who is liable for the Estate Tax; 26 U.S.C. 3102(b) specifically states who is liable for the FICA tax;: 26 U.S.C. 3202 specifically states who is liable for the Railroad Retirement Tax; 26 U.S.C. 3505 specifically imposes liability for Employment Taxes;

26 U.S.C. 4002 and 4003 specify not only who is primarily liable, but who is secondarily liable for the Luxury Passenger Automobile Excise Tax. See also: 26 U.S.C. 4051 and 4052 (Heavy Trucks and Trailers Excise Tax); 26 U.S.C. 4071 (Tire Manufacture Excise Tax); 26 U.S.C. 4219 (Manufacturers Excise Tax); 26 U.S.C. 4401 (Tax on Wagers); 26 U.S.C. 4411 (Wagering Occupational Tax); 26 U.S.C. 4483 (Vehicle Use Tax); 26 U.S.C. 4611 (Tax on Petroleum); 26 U.S.C. 4662 (Tax on Chemicals); 26 U.S.C. 4972 (Tax on Contributions to Qualified Employer Pension Plans); 26 U.S.C. 4980B (Excise Tax on Failure to Satisfy Continuation Coverage Requirements of Group Health Plans); 26 U.S.C. 4980D (Excise Tax on Failure to Meet Certain Group Health Plan Requirements); 26 U.S.C. 4980F (Excise Tax on Failure of Applicable Plans Reducing Benefit Accruals to Satisfy Notice Requirements); 26 U.S.C. 5005 (Gallonage Tax on Distilled Spirits); 26 U.S.C. 5043 (Gallonage Tax on Wines); 26 U.S.C. 5232 (Storage Tax on Imported Distilled Spirits); 26 U.S.C. 5364 (Tax on Wine Imported in Bulk); 26 U.S.C. 5418 (Tax on Beer Imported in Bulk); 26 U.S.C. 5703 (Excise Tax on Manufacture of Tobacco Products); and 26 U.S.C. 5751 (Tax on Purchase, Receipt, Possession or Sale of Tobacco Products), to name a few.

Considering the "standard in the drafting of taxation laws industry," particularly in view of the requirement of strict construction, the limitation of liability to those five instances cannot be assumed to have been an oversight. In this instance the only ones liable are those specifically named as liable, just as in any other tax provision.

Tax laws are clearly in derogation of personal rights and property interests and are, therefore, subject to strict construction, and any ambiguity must be resolved against imposition of the tax.

In Billings v. U.S., 232 U.S. 261, 34 S.Ct. 421 (1914), the Supreme Court clearly acknowledged this basic and long-standing rule of statutory construction:

"Tax statutes . . . should be strictly construed, and, if any ambiguity be found to exist, it must be resolved in favor of the citizen. Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U.S. 578, 583; United States v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369, 374; Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Herold, 198 F. 199, 201, aff'd 201 F. 918; Parkview Bldg. Assn. v. Herold, 203 F. 876, 880; Mutual Trust Co. v. Miller, 177 N.Y. 51, 57." (Id at p. 265, )

Again, in United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179, 44 S.Ct. 69 (1923), the Supreme Court clearly stated at pp. 187-88: "On behalf of the Government it is urged that taxation is a practical matter and concerns itself with the substance of the thing upon which the tax is imposed rather than with legal forms or expressions. But in statutes levying taxes the literal meaning of the words employed is most important, for such statutes are not to be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used. If the words are doubtful, the doubt must be resolved against the government and in favor of the taxpayer. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153."

This rule of strict construction against the taxing authority was reiterated in Tandy Leather Company v. United States, 347 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1965), where Judge Hutcheson of our 5th Circuit eloquently and unequivocally proclaimed at p. 694-5: .". . In ruling as he did, that the taxpayer had the obligation to show that sales of the articles in suit were not subject to the excise taxes collected, the district judge was misled by the erroneous contention of the tax collector into misstating the rule of proof in a tax case. This is: that the burden in such a case is always on the collector to show, in justification of his levy and collection of an excise tax, that the statute plainly and clearly lays the tax; that, in short, the fundamental rule is that taxes to be collectible must be clearly laid. "The Government's claim and the judge's ruling come down in effect to the proposition that the state of construction of appellants' kits had reached such an advanced level that the tax levied on the finished products could be collected on their sale, though none had been clearly laid thereon by statute. Shades of Pym and John Hampden, of the Boston tea party, and of Patrick Henry and the Virginians! There is no warrant in law for such a holding. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, at p. 153, 38 S.Ct. 53, 62 L.Ed. 211.

In 51 American Jurisprudence, "Taxation,"Sec. 316, "Strict or Liberal Construction,"supported by a great wealth of authority, it is said: 'Although it is sometimes broadly stated either that tax laws are to be strictly construed or, on the other hand, that such enactments are to be liberally construed, this apparent conflict of opinion can be reconciled if it is borne in mind that the correct rule appears to be that where the intent of meaning of tax statutes, or statutes levying taxes, is doubtful, they are, unless a contrary legislative intention appears, to be construed most strongly against the government and in favor of the taxpayer or citizen. Any doubts as to their meaning are to be resolved against the taxing authority and in favor of the taxpayer. "The judgment was wrong. It is, therefore, reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to enter judgment for plaintiffs and for further and not inconsistent proceedings." (emphasis is the Court's) See also: Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 38 S.Ct. 53, 153 (1917); Royal Caribbean Cruises v. United States, 108 F.3d 290 (11th Cir. 1997); B & M Company v. United States, 452 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1971); Kocurek v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 740 (1978); Norton Manufacturing Corporation v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 829 (1968); Grays Harbor Chair and Manufacturing Company v. United States, 265 F. Supp. 254 (1967); Russell v. United States, 260 F. Supp. 493 (1966).

When the letter of the law is subject to more than one interpretation, it must be construed against the imposition of the tax, the rule of interpretation of taxes being that the burden in such a case is always on the collector to show, in justification of his levy and collection of an excise tax, that the statute plainly and clearly lays the tax; that, in short, the fundamental rule is that taxes to be collectible must be clearly laid." Tandy Leather Company, supra, at 694.

Tax laws are clearly in derogation of personal rights and property interests and are, therefore, subject to strict construction, and any ambiguity must be resolved against imposition of the tax. In Billings v. U.S., 232 U.S. 261, 34 S.Ct. 421 (1914), the Supreme Court clearly acknowledged this basic and long-standing rule of statutory construction:

"Tax statutes . . . should be strictly construed, and, if any ambiguity be found to exist, it must be resolved in favor of the citizen. Eidman v. Martinez , 184 U.S. 578, 583; United States v. Wigglesworth , 2 Story, 369, 374; Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Herold , 198 F. 199, 201, aff'd 201 F. 918; Parkview Bldg. Assn. v. Herold, 203 F. 876, 880; Mutual Trust Co . v. Miller, 177 N.Y. 51, 57." (Id at p. 265, emphasis added)

Again, in United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179, 44 S.Ct. 69 (1923), the Supreme Court clearly stated at pp. 187-88:

"On behalf of the Government it is urged that taxation is a practical matter and concerns itself with the substance of the thing upon which the tax is imposed rather than with legal forms or expressions. But in statutes levying taxes the literal meaning of the words employed is most important, for such statutes are not to be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used. If the words are doubtful, the doubt must be resolved against the Government and in favor of the taxpayer. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153."

This rule of strict construction against the taxing authority was reiterated in Tandy Leather Company v. United States, 347 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1965), where Judge Hutcheson of our 5th Circuit eloquently and unequivocally proclaimed at p. 694-5:

.". . In ruling as he did, that the taxpayer had the obligation to show that sales of the articles in suit were not subject to the excise taxes collected, the district judge was misled by the erroneous contention of the tax collector into mis-stating the rule of proof in a tax case. This is: that the burden in such a case is always on the collector to show, in justification of his levy and collection of an excise tax, that the statute plainly and clearly lays the tax; that, in short, the fundamental rule is that taxes to be collectible must be clearly laid.

"The Government's claim and the judge's ruling come down in effect to the proposition that the state of construction of appellants' kits had reached such an advanced level that the tax levied on the finished products could be collected on their sale, though none had been clearly laid thereon by statute.

Shades of Pym and John Hampden, of the Boston tea party, and of Patrick Henry and the Virginians! There is no warrant in law for such a holding.

Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, at p. 153, 38 S.Ct. 53, 62 L.Ed. 211. In 51 American Jurisprudence, "Taxation,"Sec. 316, "Strict or Liberal Construction," supported by a great wealth of authority, it is said:

'Although it is sometimes broadly stated either that tax laws are to be strictly construed or, on the other hand, that such enactments are to be liberally construed, this apparent conflict of opinion can be reconciled if it is borne in mind that the correct rule appears to be that where the intent of meaning of tax statutes, or statutes levying taxes, is doubtful, they are, unless a contrary legislative intention appears, to be construed most strongly against the government and in favor of the taxpayer or citizen. Any doubts as to their meaning are to be resolved against the taxing authority and in favor of the taxpayer. * * *'

"The judgment was wrong. It is, therefore, reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to enter judgment for plaintiffs and for further and not inconsistent proceedings."

See also: Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 38 S.Ct. 53, 153 (1917); Royal Caribbean Cruises v. United States, 108 F.3d 290 (11th Cir. 1997); B & M Company v. United States, 452 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1971); Kocurek v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 740 (1978); Norton Manufacturing Corporation v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 829 (1968); Grays Harbor Chair and Manufacturing Company v. United States, 265 F. Supp. 254 (1967); Russell v. United States, 260 F. Supp. 493 (1966).

When the letter of the law is subject to more than one interpretation, it must be construed against the imposition of the tax, the rule of interpretation of taxes being: "that the burden in such a case is always on the collector to show, in justification of his levy and collection of an excise tax, that the statute plainly and clearly lays the tax; that, in short, the fundamental rule is that taxes to be collectible must be clearly laid." Tandy Leather Company, supra, at 694. (emphasis added)

Therefore, there is NO law or code provisions making me personally liable for the "income" tax.