IRS
Address of Levying office
City Sate Zip

We are in receipt of your Form 668-W regarding one (worker's name). (Company name) is committed as a matter of policy, and civic duty, to upholding the law, and it is our sincere desire to comply with all lawful obligations to which we are subject. You suggest such an obligation in your form, but we are troubled by what appear to us to be several areas in which your presentations, the statutory authority under which they are made, and the facts regarding (worker's name) do not seem to mesh well.

We have read the statutes under the authority of which you claim to be acting (represented at 26 USC 6331 and following), including the portions which you have omitted from the back of your form. The statutes specifically and exclusively identify federal workers (meaning those working directly for the federal government and those working for federally-connected entities) as entities whose unpaid compensation can be attached by way of a 'Notice of Levy' (and then, of course, only when liability has been properly established): "6331(a)... Levy may be made upon the accrued salary or wages of any officer, employee, or elected official, of the United States, the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of the United States or the District of Columbia, by serving a notice of levy..."

In light of the basic legal principle of "Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius,"(The inclusion of one is the exclusion of another. The certain designation of one person is an absolute exclusion of all others. ... This doctrine decrees that where law expressly describes [a] particular situation to which it shall apply, an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or excluded was intended to be omitted or excluded, Black's Law Dictionary, 6th edition)-- and the fact that (worker's name) is not a federal worker (relevant to any payments owed by this company, at least)-- we are unable to perceive how the statutes apply in this case. This understanding is reinforced by the (exclusive) specification in 26 CFR 301.6331-1 (the regulatory structure by which 26 USC 6331(a) is implemented) of three separate categories of workers to whom the relevant levy provisions apply. The three categories consist of those identified in the statute as noted above, as well as:

We presume that 'State and municipal employees' and 'Seamen' refer to those of the federal States, municipalities and Territories (as defined in the relevant revenue statutes), and federally commissioned mariners, respectively; however, such details are moot. The inclusion of these specifications unambiguously contradicts any suggestion that the authority of the levy power in regard to compensation can or should be presumed as extending beyond those entities specified, for were that actually the case, subparagraphs (ii) and (iii) cited above would be entirely superfluous and redundant. If the compensation of literally any person actually can be, or lawfully is, reached by these levy provisions, then no further specification would be needed. That these specifications are provided proves that this is not so. Within the context of the statute, 'any person' clearly DOES NOT mean "each and every American", it means "any person that is among the groups specified".

Furthermore, even if we were inclined to entertain uncertainty in that regard, we are also mindful of the United States Supreme Court's instructions in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) that,

and in Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917) that,

As our obligation to (worker's name) is entirely unambiguous, we find it impossible to honor your directive without clarification.

Finally, we are aware of the fact that the indemnification language provided in 26 USC 6332(e) which you have presented to our attention is highly provisional. That language,

clearly offers indemnification only as to the surrender of property "subject to levy upon which a levy has been made", which is to say, property upon which a levy CAN be made, and upon which a levy HAS been made. Thus, the indemnification only protects us if the property you are seeking IS "property [lawfully] subject to levy,"AND if a levy has been lawfully made upon that property. Not only does it appear self-evident that neither of these requirements have been satisfied in regard to your demand, but you have furnished no evidence of any kind to the contrary-- not even so little as a sworn declaration by someone in your organization willing to take personal responsibility for your representations as to these matters.

Such a sworn declaration, invoking the penalties of perjury against the signer, is the very least starting point at which we could begin contemplating that we might be under an actual legal obligation which overrides our known duty to (worker's name). (Indeed, it seems to us that any presentment as to either of these issues which is anything less than the formal conclusion of an independent court, in consequence of a proper adversarial proceeding, self-evidently cannot be sufficient, but further consideration along that line is premature at this point.)

Please also note the enclosed letters from Congressmen regarding this issue which we base our request on.

Therefore-- in order to ensure that no one is the victim of a misunderstanding; and to protect (company name) from the possibility of legal action against us for any of several possible criminal and civil offenses which would be attendant upon our diversion of money which is legally the property of another if done other than as strictly and unambiguously required by law-- we respectfully and in good faith ask that the following statement be executed by someone of sufficient authority in your agency and returned to us, whereupon we will give prompt consideration to your request:

Thank you for your help in this matter.

Sincerely,

Employer/Company Name, etc.